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Abstract—Recently, blockchain technology has become a topic
in the spotlight but also a hotbed of various cybercrimes. Among
them, phishing scams on blockchain have been found making a
notable amount of money, thus emerging as a serious threat to the
trading security of the blockchain ecosystem. In order to create
a favorable environment for investment, an effective method for
detecting phishing scams is urgently needed in the blockchain
ecosystem. To this end, this paper proposes an approach to detect
phishing scams on Ethereum by mining its transaction records.
Specifically, we first crawl the labeled phishing addresses from
two authorized websites and reconstruct the transaction network
according to the collected transaction records. Then, by taking
the transaction amount and timestamp into consideration, we
propose a novel network embedding algorithm called trans2vec
to extract the features of the addresses for subsequent phishing
identification. Finally, we adopt the one–class support vector
machine (SVM) to classify the nodes into normal and phish-
ing ones. Experimental results demonstrate that the phishing
detection method works effectively on Ethereum, and indicate
the efficacy of trans2vec over existing state-of-the-art algorithms
on feature extraction for transaction networks. This work is the
first investigation on phishing detection on Ethereum via network
embedding and provides insights into how features of large-scale
transaction networks can be embedded.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Ethereum, phishing detection, net-
work embedding.
I. Introduction
BLOCKCHAIN is an open and distributed ledger thatcan record transactions between two parties efficiently,
verifiably and permanently [1]. Recently, blockchain has be-
come a topic in the spotlight and the generalized blockchain
technology is expected to bring profound changes in the
fields of finance, science and technology, culture and poli-
tics [2]. One of the most important and famous applications
of blockchain in economics is digital asset (or cryptocurrency).
The bitcoin project is the first successful large-scale applica-
tion of blockchain and the first practical implementation of
cryptocurrency.
Ethereum is currently the largest blockchain platform that
supports smart contracts and the corresponding cryptocurrency
ether is the second largest cyptocurrency [3]. However, along
with its high speed development, Ethereum has also become
a hotbed of various cyber crimes [4]. Initial Coin Offering
(ICO) is a financing method for the blockchain industry, which
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refers to financing through the issuance of tokens. However,
till now, more than 10% of ICOs released on Ethereum have
been reported to be suffer from a variety of scams, including
phishing, Ponzi schemes, etc. [5]. According to a report of
Chainalysis, a provider of investigation and risk management
software for virtual currencies, there were 30,287 victims
losing $225 million in the first half of 2017 [6], indicating that
financial security has become a critical issue in the blockchain
ecosystem.
Besides, among various security issues of blockchain digital
cryptocurrency, the number of phishing scams accounts for
more than 50% of all cyber-crimes in Ethereum since 2017 and
this kind of scam has become as a main threat to trading se-
curity of Ethereum [7]. A typical phishing scam on Ethereum
happened when Bee Token, a blockchain-based home sharing
service, planned to launch its ICO on Jan. 31, 2018. Before the
official release of the ICO, phishers sent fake emails to would-
be investigators of the ICO and promised them an extra bonus
for all the contribution within the next six hours and a double
value of the token within the next two months. This phishing
scam eventually swindled nearly $1 million in just 25 hours.
In order to create a favorable environment for investment on
the blockchain ecosystem, an effective method for detection
and prevention of phishing scams is urgently needed.
In the past decades, with the rise of online business,
phishing scams emerges as a main threat to trading security. By
disguising as a trustworthy entity, phishers attempt to obtain
the users’ sensitive information such as usernames, passwords
and credit card details. The issue of phishing detection has
been widely and extensively discussed and a number of anti-
phishing methods have been proposed. However, compared
with traditional scenarios, phishing scams on Ethereum behave
very differently in several aspects.
First, as cryptocurrencies instead of cash become the target
of phishing scams, the phishers on Ethereum need to cash the
ill-gotten cryptocurrencies through exchanges for fiat money.
Second, all the transaction records of public blockchain sys-
tems such as Ethereum are publicly accessible, providing us
a complete data source for mining the transaction manner of
different Ethereum users, which may be useful for phishing
detection. Third, as most traditional phishing frauds rely on
phishing emails and websites to obtain the users’ sensitive
information, existing methods of phishing detection usually
focus on how to detect the emails or websites containing
phishing fraud information [8]. However, phishing methods
on Ethereum are usually much more diverse than that of
traditional phishing scams and phishing information can be
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2spread in a variety of forms.
Therefore, existing detection methods for traditional phish-
ing frauds cannot be directly applied to solve the phishing
detection problem on blockchain platforms like Ethereum.
Though important and urgent, the problem of anti-phishing
on blockchian ecosystem has never been discussed in current
work.
As openness and transparency are the major features of
the blockchain technology, extracting information from the
transaction records is an intuitive way to detect phishing scams
on the Ethereum platform [9]–[11]. The Ethereum transaction
history can be modeled as a directed transaction network,
where a node is a unique address (We use “address” and
“account” interchangeably in this paper) and an edge refers
to the existence of at least one transfer of ether between
two addresses. Yet when utilizing the transaction records of
Ethereum for fraud identification, we may face the following
three problems that hinders the performance of fraud identifi-
cation.
Extreme data imbalance is one of the biggest obstacles for
phishing detection on Ethereum. According to a report on
etherscan.io, a famous block explore and analytics platform
for Ethereum, the total number of addresses and the total
number of transactions of Ethereum is more than 500 million
and 3.8 billion, respectively. In contrast, the total number of
labeled phishing addresses posted on etherscan.io is only 2041.
Therefore, finding phishing addresses in such a huge network
is tantamount to finding a needle in a haystack.
Network heterogeneity of the Ethereum transaction network
refers to the fact that many transactions are related to some
public or popular addresses, such as wallet, exchanges, and
famous ICOs while the majority of addresses including both
normal and phishing addresses may have a relatively small
number of transactions. In such a heterogeneous network, it
may be more difficult to classify the phishing and non-phishing
addresses with topological information only.
Feature extraction. The identification of phishing addresses
on Ethereum is essentially a classification problem in machine
learning, whose performance is closely related to the choice
of data representation and extracted features. Only when we
extract the characteristics which can accurately distinguish
phishing and non-phishing addresses, can we effectively im-
plement the detection scheme for phishing scams.
Intuitively, the problem of phishing detection on Ethereum
can be modeled as a binary classification problem and solved
by using supervised learning approaches. However, the afore-
mentioned problems of extreme data imbalance and network
heterogeneity may influence the performance of supervised
classification methods in a large scale. Therefore, here we
employ an unsupervised anomaly detection approach, namely
one–class supporting vector machine (SVM), to solve the
phishing detection task on Ethereum by turning it into a single
classification task.
On the other hand, the performance of machine learning
methods is heavily dependent on the choice of data rep-
resentation (or features). Network embedding is a learning
paradigm which embeds nodes, links, or entire (sub) graphs
into a low-dimensional. Compared with traditional feature
engineering method, network embedding is a more efficient
and automatic way to extract features from large-scale net-
worked data, thus being a promising candidate for the issue
of phishing detection on Ethereum discussed in this work.
Different from general networks, each link in the Ethereum
transaction network has specific transaction information such
as transaction amount and timestamp. By taking the transaction
amount and timestamp into consideration, we propose a novel
network embedding method called trans2vec which converts
the transaction (trans) data of Ethereum to low dimensional
node vectors (vec).
In summary, considering the above-mentioned three chal-
lenges, we propose a comprehensive identification model for
detection of phishing scams on Ethereum. First of all, combin-
ing the transaction data obtained through an Ethereum client
and the labeled phishing addresses from two authoritative
websites, we build a large-scale Ethereum transaction network
where the nodes are classified into labeled phishing and
unlabeled addresses, and the edges present the transaction
between the addresses. Second, to extract features from the
large-scale Ethereum transaction network more accurately and
efficiently, we design a novel network embedding algorithm
called trans2vec with biases of transaction amount and times-
tamp. Finally, to deal with the problems of extreme data
imbalance and network heterogeneity, we adopt the one–class
SVM to classify the phishing and non-phishing addresses.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
• Problem To the best of our knowledge, this work is the
first investigation on phishing identification on Ethereum via
network embedding. The proposed identification model can be
utilized by uniform platforms of Ethereum to detect suspicious
phishing addresses and remind users when they attempt to
transfer money to these suspicious addresses.
• Algorithm We propose a novel network embedding model
specifically for transaction networks by incorporating the
transaction amount values and timestamps of transaction links.
It is worth mentioning that although the model in this work
is proposed for the scenario of phishing identification on
Ethereum, it can be applied to behavior recognition scenarios
of other similar transaction networks.
• Evaluation Extensive experiments on an Ethereum trans-
action network validate the effectiveness of the proposed
algorithm in the identification of phishing nodes. Additionally,
experimental results demonstrate that the proposed trans2vec
significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art network embed-
ding methods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II presents recent work about frauds on Blockchain,
phishing scams, and anomaly detection based on network
embedding. In Section III, we provide an overview of the
Ethereum data and then give the problem definition of phishing
identification on Ethereum. Then we present the technical
details of the proposed embedding algorithm trans2vec and the
overall detection framework in Section IV. In Section V, we
evaluate the phishing detection performance of the proposed
method on Ethereum and assess the parameter sensitivity and
scalability of trans2vec. Finally, we draw conclusions and
3discuss future work in Section VI.
II. Background and Related Work
A. Frauds on Blockchain
Blockchain was invented by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 to
serve as the public transaction ledger of the cryptocurrency
bitcoin. The design of bitcoin has inspired various other
applications, and the blockchain technology which has the
features of openness and decentralization has been widely used
by cryptocurrencies.
Ethereum is an open-source blockchain-based platform fea-
turing smart contract functionality. The concept of Ethereum
was first proposed in late 2013, and formal development of
the Ethereum software project began in early 2014.
However, with the rapid development of blockchain tech-
nology and applications of smart contracts, there have been
a growing number of frauds in the name of digital currency
trading and technological innovation [12]. Vasek et al. [13]
performed the first empirical study of financial scams on
Bitcoin and defined four categories of scams: Ponzi schemes,
mining scams, scam wallets and fraudulent exchanges. On
the platform of Ethereum, a number of studies have probed
into the vulnerability of smart contracts and the security of
ICOs [14]–[18]. For example, Atzei et al. [14] analyzed the
security of Ethereum smart contracts by discussing the major
attacks and threats.
In addition to research on smart contracts and ICO appli-
cations, a series of studies focusing on scam detection in the
Ethereum platform has been conducted. Bartolett et al. [19]
reported the first comprehensive investigation of the Ethereum
Ponzi scheme. Later in [20], Chen et al. put forward a method
to identify hidden smart Ponzi schemes through data mining
and machine learning approaches.
B. Phishing Scams
Recently, phishing frauds emerge as a main threat to the
trading security of Ethereum and number of this kind of
frauds accounts for more than 50% of all cyber-crimes in
Ethereum since 2017 [6]. However, phishing frauds and anti-
phishing methods on the blockchian ecosystem have never
been discussed in current work.
Phishing refers to a form of online threat defined as the art
of impersonating a website of an honest firm aiming to acquire
users’ private information such as usernames, passwords and
social security numbers [21]. Typically, a traditional phishing
attack begins by sending an e-mail that seems to be from an
authentic organization to victims.
To counter the threat from phishing scams, a number of anti-
phishing solutions have been proposed by both industry and
academia. For example, Abdelhamid et al. [21] investigated
phishing detection using a multi-label classifier, Medvet et
al. [22] presented a novel technique to visually compare a
suspected phishing page with a legitimate one, and Zouina et
al. [23] presented a detection system for phishing websites
using support vector machine (SVM).
In summary, as traditional phishing frauds usually rely on
phishing emails and websites to obtain users’ sensitive infor-
mation, most existing detection methods of phishing scams are
based on text detection of email and web content.
Compared with traditional scenarios, phishing scams on
Ethereum can be conducted in more diverse ways. This kind
of phishing frauds can not only obtain the users sensitive
information and money via phishing websites, but also swindle
money directly by spreading phishing addresses to victims via
emails, websites and online chats. A widely known example
is the phishing scam on Bee Token ICO [24]. Bee Token
is a blockchain-based home sharing service which planned
to launch its public ICO on Jan. 31, 2018. However, before
the startup runs its token sale, the phishers sent a fake email
to would-be buyers stating the opening of the ICO. In the
email, the phisher induced the investors to transfer money to
a particular address by promising them a 100 bonus within
the next 6 hours and double value of the Bee token within the
next 2 months. Without any phishing website, this phishing
scam eventually gathered about $1 million from the investors
in only 25 hours.
Therefore, traditional phishing detection methods based on
websites cannot be directly applied to solve the phishing
detection problem on Ethereum, because only a small part of
phishing scams are implemented through phishing websites.
However, thanks to the openness and transparency of
blockchain, victims of phishing scams can usually find out
where their fraudulent funds went and report the suspi-
cious phishing addresses. Besides, all transaction records on
Ethereum are publicly accessible, thus making it possible to
identify phishing addresses via mining the transaction behavior
between addresses.
To this end, considering the unique characteristics of
Ethereum environment, we propose a novel framework
of phishing detection by extracting information from the
Ethereum transaction records. In particular, here we model the
transaction records between addresses as a directed transaction
network and then using a network embedding method to learn
the latent features of each address.
Fig.1 compares the phishing process and phishing detection
framework between traditional scenarios and Ethereum. We
can see that the Ethereum phishing detection is different from
the conventional way in terms of detection objects, adopted
data sources, as well as detection methods. First of all, unlike
traditional detection methods aiming to figure out the phishing
websites, our detection object here is to detect the Ethereum
addresses of the phishers. Therefore, compared with traditional
methods, the phishing detection framework discussed in this
paper has a distinct detection granularity.
Second, traditional detection models are mainly based on
content and URL information of the websites [23], [25], [26],
while the detection framework here utilizes the transaction
records between Etherum addresses to distinguish the phishing
and non-phishing addresses. Third, in terms of detection
methods, most existing detection methods of phishing scams
extracts features of websites such as URLs, hyperlinks, sen-
sitive words hinting at the possibility of phishing and other
content-based features based on text detection of email and
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Fig. 1. Comparison of the phishing process and phishing detection framework between (a) traditional scenarios and (b) Ethereum.
web content, while here we model the Ethereum transaction
history as a directed transaction network and propose a net-
work embedding method which can automatically learn the
features of addresses to distinguish phishing and non-phishing
addresses.
C. Anomaly Detection Based on Network Embedding
With the explosive growth of big data, network-based
anomaly detection algorithms have attracted increasing atten-
tion from both academia and industry. Network-based anomaly
detection methods can be applied to both static and dynamic
graphs with tags or attributes, applicable to many areas such
as financial networks, security, healthcare and so on [27].
Anomaly detection based on network embedding is an
emerging technique in recent years. Some of these anomaly
detection techniques propose their own embedding methods
based on the characteristics of the network [27], [28], while
some others adopt existing embedding methods. Existing
network embedding methods can be categorized into four
main classes: factorization methods [29], [30], random walk
techniques [31], [32], deep learning [33], [34] and other
miscellaneous strategies [35]. After optimizing the embedding
space, results of the learned node embeddings can be utilized
as extracted feature inputs for downstream machine learning
tasks.
III. Data Description and Problem Definition
This study aims to detect the phishing addresses on
Ethereum based on large-scale transaction records. In this
section, we first provide an overview of the transaction data
and then introduce the problem of fault identification on
Ethereum.
A. Data Description
Transaction Records. In order to obtain the Ethereum
transaction network, we adopt the same method used in [36]
to collect transaction records from the launch of Ethereum
through an Ethereum client. According to the Ethereum Yellow
Paper [37], each Ethereum client contains all transaction
history. In this way, we can obtain a transaction record dataset
we need, and then build a transaction network where each
node represents an address and each edge indicates the ether
transaction between a pair of addresses. It should be noted that
in this transaction network, each edge between two nodes is
assigned with the total transferred amount and the timestamp
of the last transaction between them.
Labeled Phishing Addresses. The issue of phishing iden-
tification on Ethereum can be modeled as a binary clas-
sification problem, which is a typical supervised learning
task. Therefore, we need enough labeled data to train the
classification model and further verify the effectiveness of
our method. In this work, we collect the labeled data about
phishing scams from two authoritative websites which re-
port various illegal behaviors on Ethereum. One is Ether-
ScamDB (https://etherscamdb.info/scams), which collect in-
formation about online scams to guide Ethereum investors
away from possible frauds. The other one is Etherscan
(https://etherscan.io/), which serves as an Ethereum block ex-
plorer. The reports about various scams on these two websites
show not only the content of scams, but also the addresses
suspected of involvement in frauds. From the various scams
reported on these two websites, we extracted addresses which
are related to phishing scams. To ensure the accuracy of the
labeled data, we crawl all the reports about phishing scams
before March 10th, 2019, and only the addresses reported by
both websites are labeled as phishing addresses.
After obtaining all the transaction records, we obtain more
than 500 million addresses and 3.8 billion transaction records.
However, only 1259 addresses are labeled as phishing ad-
dresses. Therefore, the extreme data imbalance is one of the
biggest obstacle for phishing detection on Ethereum. Besides,
all addresses on Ethereum can be categorized into several
types. As shown in Fig. 2, the red points are labeled as
phishing addresses, the blue points are known exchanges,
the yellow points are smart contract addresses, and other
points are common unknown addresses. The different types
of nodes described above tend to behave distinctly in terms
5of transaction characteristics. For example, some public or
popular addresses such as the blue and yellow points may
involve in a large number of transactions, while a majority of
phishing and common addresses may have a relatively small
number of transactions. Therefore, the heterogeneity nature of
the Ethereum network may make it more difficult to classify
the phishing and non-phishing nodes.
Due to the aforementioned issues of extreme data imbalance
and network heterogeneity, it is difficult to obtain decent
performance by modeling this detection problem into a su-
pervised binary classification problem. Therefore, here we
adopt an unsupervised anomaly detection approach called one-
class SVM by turning this problem into a single classification
task [38]. In this way, the behavior of phishing nodes can be
distinguishable from the others in a suitable feature space,
and the task of detecting the phishing nodes is a “outlier
detection” or “one-class classification”, which aim to find a
decision surface around the targets. The nodes that lie inside
this decision surface are classified as targets (i.e., the phishing
nodes), whereas nodes that lie outside are classified as outliers
(i.e., other nodes).
B. Problem Definition
Through the above operations on the Ethereum data, we ob-
tain a transaction network. Let G = (V, E), where V represent
the set of nodes, E is the set of edges. GL = (V, E, X,Y) is
a partially labeled network, with edge attributes X ∈ R|E|×S
where S is the size of the feature space for each edge, and
Y ∈ R|V |×|Y| where Y is the set of labels. In the Ethereum
transaction network, each edge contains two critical attributes,
namely, transaction amount and timestamp. For the scenario
of phishing address identification, Y contains two labels, i.e.,
+1 for phishing node and −1 for normal samples.
The principal aim of this work is to detect phishing scams
on an extremely large-scale Ethereum network. Because of the
Fig. 2. A simple example of an Ethereum transaction network with four kinds
of addresses, namely phishing addresses, known exchanges, smart contract
addresses, and common addresses with unknown labels.
Fig. 3. The process of network construction and embedding for the Ethereum
transaction network.
large-scale of the network and the imbalance of data labels, we
propose a biased network embedding algorithm, which incor-
porates the transaction amount and timestamp of each edge to
better capture the information from the Ethereum transaction
network. The goal of the network embedding algorithm is to
learn the embeddings of all nodes XE ∈ R|V |×d, where d is
the number of dimensions for feature representation. These
obtained node embeddings can be used as feature inputs for
the downstream classification task.
Fig. 3 gives a simple illustration of the embedding procedure
on Ethereum transaction network.
IV. Model Framework
In this section, we first introduce the proposed network
embedding method for transaction networks called trans2vec,
including the feature learning process of network embed-
ding and the proposed neighborhood sampling strategy for
Ethereum, and then describe the overall framework of phishing
detection.
A. Feature Learning Process
In recent years, random walk based network embedding has
been proposed and widely used to automate the process of
feature extraction.
This kind of network embedding aims to learn a mapping
function from nodes to node embeddings ( f : V 7−→ R|V |×d),
maximizing the likelihood of co-occurrence of neighbor nodes
in a d-dimensional feature space. The embedding process
consists of two main parts: the first part is a random walk
generator, which is used to capture the structural relationships
between nodes; the second part is the Skip-gram architecture,
which is used to learn the node embedding via solving a
maximum likelihood optimization problem. By conducting
truncated random walks, a large-scale network is transformed
into a set of node sequences sampled from it. For each source
node u ∈ V , each node sequence sampled from the network
by a particular sampling strategy S is defined as NS (u) ∈ V .
Skip-gram is a widely adopted architecture for data repre-
sentation learning which was originally proposed for natural
language processing [39]. The objective of Skip-gram is max-
imizing the co-occurrence probability among the words that
6appear within a window. Inspired by the Skip-gram architec-
ture, network researchers proposed to present a network as a
“document”.
Following previous studies on network embeddings, here we
employ the Skip-gram architecture to optimize the following
objective function, which maximizes the log-probability of the
occurrence of nodes from the neighborhood NS (u) for a node
u conditioned on its node embedding, i.e.,
max
f
∑
u∈V
log Pr( NS (u) | f (u)). (1)
In this work, we adopt the stochastic gradient descent
approach to optimize f by solving (1).
B. trans2vec for Transaction Networks
As mentioned above, the Skip-gram architecture adopted
in random walk based network embedding methods was
originally inspired by the word2vec in natural language pro-
cessing [40]. As words in natural language are linearly listed,
it is reasonable to use sliding windows to define neighbors
of words. However, nodes in the network are not linearly
connected, and thus we need to use a method to define the
neighborhood of a node.
For the Ethereum transaction network, considering the
amount value and timestamp of each transaction, we propose
three targeted biased random walk strategies for neighbor
sampling, which can extract the indispensable information of
transaction network more comprehensively.
1) Random Walks: Given a source node u, we perform
the random walk to obtain node sequences with a fixed length
l. Let ci denote the i-th node in the sequence, starting with
c0 = u. The probability of choosing a particular node x as ci
is:
P(ci = x | ci−1 = u) =
 piuxZ i f (u, x) ∈ E0 otherwise , (2)
where piux is the unnormalized transition probability from
nodes u to x, and Z is the normalizing constant.
2) Search Strategies: In a random walk based network
embedding algorithm, it is pivotal to choose proper prefer-
ences in the walking process. For example, node2vec defines
two parameters to interpolate between depth-first search and
breadth-first search [32]. This highly adaptable algorithm takes
into account both local and global information. In this work,
we focus on a type of transaction network which contains
some unique information. For financial transaction networks
like the Ethereum, each edge has a particular amount and
timestamp, which is very critical but cannot be captured by
general random walk based network embedding methods. In
order to learn the features of a transaction network more
comprehensively, we design biased random walk strategies
based on transaction amount and timestamp.
The process of sampling neighborhoods of a node can be
viewed as a local search. For the purpose of a fair comparison,
we set the size of the neighborhood set as k and then search
a number of sets for each node. For the Ethereum transaction
network discussed in this work, we consider two kinds of
biased sampling methods.
Amount-based biased sampling. Intuitively, a larger
amount value of the transaction implies a stronger or closer
relationship between the two involved nodes. We denote Vu as
the set of nodes directly connected to node u and use a linear
function to incorporate amount information to the sampling
probability. Under the amount-based biased sampling, starting
from node u, the transition probability from node u to a
neighbor node x ∈ Vu is given as
PAux =
A(u, x)∑
x′∈Vu A(u, x
′ )
, (3)
where A(u, x) denotes the total amount value of the transac-
tion(s) between nodes u and x.
Time-based biased sampling. In addition, each edge has
a unique timestamp. Here we assume that the later the trans-
action is, the greater the impact on the current relationship of
the nodes. First of all, we map the realistic timestamps of the
edges to discrete time steps. Let T : E −→ Z be a function that
sorts the transaction edges in ascending order of timestamps.
Similarly, under the time-based biased sampling, starting from
node u, the transition probability from node u to a neighbor
node x ∈ Vu is
PTux =
T (u, x)∑
x′∈Vu T (u, x
′ )
, (4)
where T (u, x) denotes the timestamp of the latest transaction
between nodes u and x.
Fig. 4 plots a simplified illustration of the random walk
procedure in a transaction network. Starting from node u, the
node x4 will be most likely to be chosen as the next node
when the amount-based sampling is adopted. While under the
time-based biased sampling, node x1 should have the largest
probability to be sampled.
Search bias parameter α. In order to take both time and
amount into account, we use a parameter α(0 ≤ α ≤ 1) to
balance their effects. The unnormalized transition probability
from nodes u to x can be given as
piux(α) = PAαux · PT 1−αux . (5)
Here the parameter α allows the sampling procedure to
adjust its bias between time and amount. As shown in Fig. 4,
the edge (u, x1) has a larger value of time step but a smaller
value of amount when compared with the edge (u, x4). The
strategy will be more likely to sample node x1 when α is very
x1
x2 x3
x4
u
A(u
, x1)
= 1
T (u
, x1)
= 20
A(u, x
2 )
=
2
T (u, x
2 )
=
8
A(
u,
x 3)
=
1
T (
u,
x 3)
=
5
A(u, x4) = 3
T (u, x1) = 10
Fig. 4. Illustration of a Ethereum transaction network
7small and tends to sample node x4 otherwise. In this way, the
search bias can be balanced between time and amount weights.
Algorithm 1 trans2vec algorithm
Require: (The transaction network G = (V, E, X) where X
contains the transaction amount and timestamp information
of all edges, embedding dimension d, walks per node r, walk
length l, context/neighborhood size k, search bias parameter
α)
pi=PreprocessTransitionProbability(G,α)
G
′
= (V, E, X, pi)
Initialize walks to Empty
for iter = 1 to r do
for each node u ∈ V do
walk=trans2vecwalk(G
′
, u, l)
Append walk to walks
end for
end for
f = StochasticGradientDescent( k, d, walks)
return f
trans2vecwalk (Graph G′ = (V, E, pi), Starting node
u, Length l, search bias α)
Initialize walk to [u]
for walk iter = 1 to l do
curr = walk[-1]
V curr = GetNeighbors(curr, G
′
, α)
s = AliasSample(Vcurr, pi)
Append s to walk
end for
return walk
3) The trans2vec Algorithm: The proposed random walk
based network embedding method is named trans2vec as its
principal task is to embed the transaction information into
node representation vectors. The pseudocode for the proposed
trans2vec is listed Algorithm 1. We conduct the process of
trans2vec random walk to sample the large-scale transaction
network. Specifically, we perform r random walks with walk
length l from each source node. At every step of the walk,
we design a biased sampling strategy, in which a search bias
parameter α allows us to smoothly transfer between the two bi-
ases based on transaction amount and time. It should be noted
that as the transition probabilities pivx can be precomputed, the
random walk procedure of the trans2vec can be conducted
efficiently in O(1) time using alias sampling. In addition,
similar to previous work [32], we first use a preprocessing
procedure to calculate the transition probabilities, then conduct
the trans2vec random walks, and finally optimize the mapping
function f of the node embeddings by utilizing stochastic
gradient descent.
C. Phishing Detection Framework
After utilizing the proposed trans2vec algorithm to obtain
node embeddings, we use them as feature inputs for the task
of phishing scam detection on Ethereum. Fig. 5 presents the
overall framework of the phishing detection method which
contains three main steps.
Fig. 5. The framework of phishing detection on Ethererum.
First of all, combining the collected transaction records
through an Ethereum client and the labeled phishing ad-
dresses from two authoritative websites, we build a large-scale
Ethereum transaction network where the nodes are classified
into phishing and other addresses, and the edges presents the
transaction between each pair of addresses. Second, to extract
features from the Ethereum transaction network more accu-
rately and efficiently, we design a novel network embedding
algorithm trans2vec with biases of transaction amount and
timestamp. Finally, we adopt the one-class SVM to classify
the phishing and other addresses.
V. Experiments
In this section, we present experimental results of the
proposed phishing detection framework. First, we describe the
experimental dataset. Then, we explain the setup of the experi-
ments in detail. Finally, we perform the phishing detection task
on Ethereum transaction data to demonstrate the effectiveness,
parameter sensitivity and scalability of the proposed algorithm
and give an analysis of experimental results.
A. Datasets
As discussed in Section III-A, here we adopt the one-class
SVM method to classify phishing and non-phishing nodes. As
1259 addresses are labeled as phishing nodes which are the
targets of the detection approach, we randomly select 1259
unlabeled nodes as the outliers.
With these labeled and unlabeled nodes being the central
nodes, we extract their first-order neighbors and the connected
edges between all of them to form a subnetwork. In our
experiments, we repeat the random selection procedure of un-
labeled nodes for 50 times and thus obtain 50 subnetworks. As
shown in Table I, these subnetworks contains more than 60,000
TABLE I
Network properties of the 50 extracted subnetworks.
Network Properties Node Number Edge Number Average Degree
Average 60442.3 236221.6 6.62
Maximum 97221 310244 7.26
Minimum 49862 162766 6.12
8nodes and 200,000 links on average. Then each subnetwork
is embedded via the proposed trans2vec method to obtain
the feature vectors of the central nodes for the downstream
classification task. In the final classification task, we set 80%
of the total data as training data and the rest as test data.
B. Baseline Methods
Referring to Fig. 5, we propose a biased random walk based
network embedding method to obtain the node feature vector.
In the experiment, our proposed method is compared with
two popular network embedding approaches based on random
walk, i.e., DeepWalk and node2vec.
• DeepWalk [31] This is the pioneering work to learn
node representations via simulating unbiased random walks.
It propose to sample the network via random walks on the
network and defines the neighborhood/contex of a node by
its co-occurred nodes on the walks. After the process of node
sampling, it learns node embeddings by predicting each node’s
neighborhood.
• node2vec [32] Following DeepWalk, node2vec defines a
more flexible notion of a node’s neighborhood and exploits a
biased random walk to encode both local and global network
structure.
Considering the properties of a transaction network, the pro-
posed trans2vec strategy samples the network based on both
two kinds of transaction features, including the transaction
amount and timestamp. In order to observe the effect of each
feature more clearly, we also consider biased sampling method
based on only time or amount in the experiments.
To implement these network embedding methods, we need
to set the following parameters: embedding size d, walks per
node r, walk length l, context size k. In our experiment, the
parameter settings are d = 64, r = 20, l = 5, and k = 10.
For node2vec, we set p = 0.25 and q = 0.75 according to the
guidance given in [32]. For the proposed trans2vec, we vary
the search bias parameter α from 0 to 1, and set α = 0.5 as
the default value to balance the effects of amount and time
biases.
However, all the aforementioned network embedding meth-
ods learn and encode the topological structural information
of the Ethereum transaction network automatically. Therefore,
in order to verify the importance of the network structural
information as well as the time and amount information of
the transactions, we consider three non-embedding methods to
extract local features of the addresses for phishing detection,
namely, time features only method, amount features only
method, as well as time plus amount features method. In
detail, the time features only method extracts the maximum
time interval, the minimum time interval, total transaction time
and trading frequency of each address; the amount features
only method extracts the maximum transaction amount, the
minimum transaction amount, total transaction amount, and
average transaction amount of each address; the time plus
amount features method consider the above eight statistics as
extracted features.
C. Performance Evaluation Metrics
To evaluate the performance of different methods in terms
of phishing detection, we consider three evaluation metrics,
namely precision, recall, and F-score. We repeat experiments
on each subnetwork for 100 times and report the average
results.
The three metrics are defined as follows:
Precision =
true positive
true positive + false positive
,
Recall =
true positive
true positive + false negative
,
F − score = 2 × Precision × Recall
Precision + Recall
.
TABLE II
Performance comparisons of non-embedding algorithms which consider only
time features, amount features, and both. The best results are marked in
bold.
Method Precision Recall F-score
Time Features Only 0.351 0.302 0.326
Amount Features Only 0.396 0.321 0.358
Time + Amount Features 0.509 0.478 0.494
TABLE III
Performance comparisons of different embedding algorithms when the
embedding dimension d is set as 64. The best results are marked in bold.
Method Precision Recall F-score
Deepwalk 0.799 0.762 0.780
Node2vec 0.870 0.822 0.845
Time-based Bias 0.864 0.822 0.842
Amount-based Bias 0.883 0.855 0.868
trans2vec 0.927 0.893 0.908
D. Classification Performance
We first compare the results of the non-embedding methods
which have not consider the structural information, and the
experimental results given in Table II indicates that all these
methods cannot achieve satisfying performance of phishing
detection. Moreover, we can observe that considering the
combination of the two kinds of features leads to better classi-
fication performance than using only time or amount feature.
This result indicates that without structural information, only
time or/and amount features of the addresses are not sufficient
to achieve decent classification performance.
Given embedding size d = 64, the experimental results
of the embedding methods which encode network structural
information are compared in Table III. The results given in
Table III demonstrate that the proposed trans2vec method
outperforms the other embedding methods in terms of all
evaluation metrics. Moreover, we can observe that both the
amount-based and time-based samplings perform better than
the unbiased DeepWalk, and a comparison between these
two biases indicates that the amount factor tends to have a
9TABLE IV
Performance comparisons of different classifiers when the features are
extracted using the proposed tran2vec with d = 64. The best results are
marked in bold.
Method Precision Recall F-score
Logistic regression 0.762 0.738 0.75
Naive bayes 0.771 0.702 0.736
Isolation forest 0.821 0.849 0.835
One-class SVM 0.927 0.893 0.908
more important influence on the embedding results for the
Ethereum transaction network, and thus achieve better perfor-
mance than the time-based bias. Therefore, Table III indicates
that extracting only structural information cannot ensure good
performance. After incorporating time and amount features
of the transactions with structural information, the proposed
embedding method performs best.
Combining the results in Tables II and III, we can conclude
that the structural information of the transaction networks,
as well as the transaction time and amount are indispensable
features for the phishing detection task.
As shown in Fig. 6, we gradually increase the embedding
dimension of the node vectors from 4 to 64. Obviously, the
larger the node vector dimensions, the better the classification
performance. This is because that larger node vector dimen-
sions are likely to retain richer network structure and node
information. We observe that when the embedding dimension
d is set as 4, performance of trans2vec in terms of recall
and F-score is relatively worse than that of the amount-based
biased method, implying that the trans2vec method can embed
richer information and thus requires a larger value of d for
data representation. When we select a larger value of the
embedding dimension (d ≥ 8 in Fig. 6), trans2vec performs
best in terms of precision, recall and F-measure.
Besides, the selected classifier of the detection framework
is also a factor affecting the detection performance. Therefore,
here we consider several widely considered classifiers as base-
lines, namely, logistic regression, naive bayes and isolation
forest. Using the node representation vectors of trans2vec with
dimension d = 64 as input features, the detection results of
different classifiers are compared in Table IV. We can observe
that the performance of the one-class SVM is obviously better
than other classifiers as it is more suitable for the problem of
anomaly detection here, and thus we select it as the classifier
in our phishing detection framework.
E. Parameter Sensitivity
For the proposed trans2vec, there exists a number of param-
eters which may influence the embedding results. In Figs. 7(a)-
(e), we evaluate the effects of a series of parameters on the
performance of trans2vec on the phishing detection task on the
Ethereum transaction network. When a particular parameter is
under evaluating, all other parameters are set as default values.
In this part, we only consider F-measure for performance
comparison.
We first explore the effect of α on F-meaure by varying α
from 0.1 to 0.9. As shown in Fig. 7(a), the peak value appears
when α is around 0.5. This result indicates that the combi-
nation of these two biases can achieve better classification
performance. When α is set as 0, the algorithm becomes time-
based bias sampling. While when α is set to 1, the algorithm
becomes pure amount-based bias sampling.
We also examine the influence of the embedding dimension
d and the node’s neighborhood parameters including the
number of walks r, walk length l, and neighborhood size k. As
shown in Fig. 7(b), with an increase of the embedding dimen-
sion d, the algorithm can achieve better detection performance.
Besides, we observe from Fig. 7(c) that an increase of the
context size k from 6 to 10 can improve F-measure obviously
but the performance seems to saturate when k reaches 10.
Similarly, referring to Fig. 7(d), increasing the length of walk
l from 2 to 6 can boost the performance. However, when l
continues to increase, the algorithm will always walk to the
same node, thus reducing the quality of node representations
and the overall performance. Fig. 7(e) indicates that a larger
number of walks per node also improve the performance,
which is not surprising because it indicates a larger number
of sampling times to learn network representations.
F. Scalability
To evaluate the scalability of trans2vec, we conduct this
algorithm with default parameter values for Erdos-Renyi (ER)
random graphs with node sizes increasing from 102 to 105.
For each network size, we do 100 independent trials and
compute the average running time. As the ER random graphs
are generated using a theoretical complex network model, the
edges cannot contain the transaction amount or timestamp
which is required by the trans2vec to calculate the transition
probability. To this end, we set the transaction amount and
timestamp of each edge in the random graphs as 1 to facilitate
a similar calculation.
The results of running time (in log scale) is shown in
Fig. 7(f). We observe that trans2vec scales linearly with the
number of nodes, which is acceptable in practice. Therefore,
we can conclude that trans2vec is a scalable method which is
suitable for applications on large-scale networks.
VI. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we conducted the first systematic study of
phishing scams detection on Ethereum via network embed-
ding. Specifically, a three-step framework was proposed to
identify phishing nodes using their features extracted from
Ethereum transaction history with network embedding algo-
rithms. To extract features from the Ethereum transaction
network more accurately and efficiently, we designed a novel
network embedding algorithm trans2vec with biases of trans-
action amount and timestamp. Experiments on real-world
Ethereum transaction records demonstrated the effectiveness
of our proposed detection framework and the superiority of
trans2vec over baseline methods in terms of feature extraction
for Ethereum-like transaction networks.
Though urgent and important, the problem of phishing
scam detection on Ethereum is still unexplored till now. As
a preliminary work in this area, we hope this work can attract
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Fig. 6. Performance comparisons of different methods with various embedding dimensions d in terms of (a) precision, (b) recall, and (c) F-score.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Fig. 7. Results of parameters analysis (a–e) and scalability (f).
extensive attention and efforts in this field. Several important
research issues can be explored along this topic. First, with
more comprehensive domain knowledge and a more detailed
data analysis, a more systematic and generalized network
embedding algorithm can be proposed for Ethereum and other
large-scale transaction networks. Second, as this paper focuses
on the problem of phishing detection, effects of the proposed
network embedding on other realistic downstream tasks remain
to be verified. Third, detection and prevention methods for
other illegal behaviors on Ethereum such as gambling, money
laundry, Ponzi schemes, etc., can be proposed by utilizing the
openness nature of the blockchain technology.
References
[1] M. Iansiti and K. R. Lakhani, “The truth about blockchain,” Harvard
Bus. Rev., vol. 95, no. 1, pp. 118–127, 2017.
[2] Y. Yuan and F.-Y. Wang, “Blockchain and cryptocurrencies: Model,
techniques, and applications,” IEEE Trans. Syst., Man, Cybern., Syst.,
vol. 48, no. 9, pp. 1421–1428, 2018.
[3] S. Wang, L. Ouyang, Y. Yuan, X. Ni, X. Han, and F. Wang,
“Blockchain-enabled smart contracts: Architecture, applications, and
future trends,” IEEE Trans. Syst., Man, Cybern., Syst., to be published,
doi: 10.1109/TSMC.2019.2895123, 2019.
[4] A. Holub and J. O’Connor, “Coinhoarder: Tracking a ukrainian bitcoin
phishing ring dns style,” in Proc. 2018 APWG Symp. on Elec. Cri. Res.
San Diego, CA, USA: IEEE, 2018, pp. 1–5.
[5] M.-A. Russon. Ethereum under siege: Scammers make
$700,000 in 6 days from slack and reddit phishing
attacks. [Online]. Available: https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/
ethereum-under-siege-scammers-make-700000-6-days-slack-reddit-phishing-attacks-1629866
[6] EtherScamDB. Etherscamdb. [Online]. Available: https://blog.
chainalysis.com/reports/the-rise-of-cybercrime-on-ethereum
[7] M. Conti, E. S. Kumar, C. Lal, and S. Ruj, “A survey on security and
privacy issues of bitcoin,” IEEE Commun. Surv. Tut., vol. 20, no. 4, pp.
3416–3452, 2018.
[8] M. Khonji, Y. Iraqi, and A. Jones, “Phishing detection: a literature
survey,” IEEE Commun. Surv. Tut., vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 2091–2121, 2013.
[9] Z. Yang, K. Yang, L. Lei, K. Zheng, and V. C. Leung, “Blockchain-based
11
decentralized trust management in vehicular networks,” IEEE Internet
Things, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 1495 – 1505, 2018.
[10] T. Chang and D. Svetinovic, “Improving Bitcoin ownership identification
using transaction patterns analysis,” IEEE Trans. Syst., Man, Cybern.,
Syst., to be published, doi: 10.1109/TSMC.2018.2867497, 2018.
[11] I. Alqassem, I. Rahwan, and D. Svetinovic, “The anti-social system
properties: Bitcoin network data analysis,” IEEE Trans. Syst., Man,
Cybern., Syst., to be published, doi: 10.1109/TSMC.2018.2883678,
2018.
[12] P. Monamo, V. Marivate, and B. Twala, “Unsupervised learning for
robust bitcoin fraud detection,” in Inf. Sec. for SA. IEEE, 2016, pp.
129–134.
[13] M. Vasek and T. Moore, “Theres no free lunch, even using bitcoin:
Tracking the popularity and profits of virtual currency scams,” in Proc.
Int. Conf. on Financ. Crypt. and Data Sec. Springer, 2015, pp. 44–61.
[14] N. Atzei, M. Bartoletti, and T. Cimoli, “A survey of attacks on ethereum
smart contracts (sok),” in Principles of Security and Trust. Springer,
2017, pp. 164–186.
[15] I. Grishchenko, M. Maffei, and C. Schneidewind, “A semantic frame-
work for the security analysis of ethereum smart contracts,” in Proc. Int.
Conf. on Princ. Sec. and Tru. Thessaloniki, Greece: Springer, 2018,
pp. 243–269.
[16] G. Fenu, L. Marchesi, M. Marchesi, and R. Tonelli, “The ICO phe-
nomenon and its relationships with ethereum smart contract environ-
ment,” in Proc. 2018 Int. Workshop Blockchain Oriented Software
Engineering. Campobasso, Italy: IEEE, 2018, pp. 26–32.
[17] C. F. Torres and M. Steichen, “The art of the scam: Demystifying hon-
eypots in ethereum smart contracts,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.06976,
2019.
[18] M. Vasek and T. Moore, “Analyzing the Bitcoin ponzi scheme ecosys-
tem,” in Int. Conf. on Financ. Cryp. and Data Secur. Springer, 2018,
pp. 101–112.
[19] M. Bartoletti, S. Carta, T. Cimoli, and R. Saia, “Dissecting ponzi
schemes on ethereum: identification, analysis, and impact,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1703.03779, 2017.
[20] W. Chen, Z. Zheng, J. Cui, E. Ngai, P. Zheng, and Y. Zhou, “Detecting
ponzi schemes on Ethereum: Towards healthier blockchain technology,”
in Proc. 24th Int. Conf. on World Wide Web. Geneva, Switzerland:
International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee, 2018,
pp. 1409–1418.
[21] N. Abdelhamid, A. Ayesh, and F. Thabtah, “Phishing detection based
associative classification data mining,” Expert Syst. Appl., vol. 41, no. 13,
pp. 5948–5959, 2014.
[22] E. Medvet, E. Kirda, and C. Kruegel, “Visual-similarity-based phishing
detection,” in Proc. 4th Int. Conf. on Sec. and Priv. Comm. Net. Istanbul,
Turkey: ACM, 2008, p. 22.
[23] M. Zouina and B. Outtaj, “A novel lightweight url phishing detection
system using svm and similarity index,” Human-centric Comp. and Inf.
Sci., vol. 7, no. 1, p. 17, 2017.
[24] N. De. Bee token ICO stung by $1 million phishing scam. [Online].
Available: https://www.coindesk.com/bee-token-phishing-scam
[25] M. Moghimi and A. Y. Varjani, “New rule-based phishing detection
method,” Expert Syst. Appl., vol. 53, pp. 231–242, 2016.
[26] O. K. Sahingoz, E. Buber, O. Demir, and B. Diri, “Machine learning
based phishing detection from urls,” Expert Syst. Appl., vol. 117, pp.
345–357, 2019.
[27] L. Akoglu, H. Tong, and D. Koutra, “Graph based anomaly detection
and description: a survey,” Data Min. Knowl. Disc., vol. 29, no. 3, pp.
626–688, 2015.
[28] T. Chen, L.-A. Tang, Y. Sun, Z. Chen, and K. Zhang, “Entity embedding-
based anomaly detection for heterogeneous categorical events,” in Proc.
25th Int. J. Conf. on Artif. Intell. New York, USA: IEEE, 2016, pp.
1396–1403.
[29] M. Belkin and P. Niyogi, “Laplacian eigenmaps and spectral techniques
for embedding and clustering,” in Adv Neur In., British Columbia,
Canada, 2002, pp. 585–591.
[30] S. T. Roweis and L. K. Saul, “Nonlinear dimensionality reduction by
locally linear embedding,” Science, vol. 290, no. 5500, pp. 2323–2326,
2000.
[31] B. Perozzi, R. Al-Rfou, and S. Skiena, “Deepwalk: Online learning of
social representations,” in Proc. 20th ACM SIGKDD Int. Conf. on Knowl.
Disc. and Data Min. New York, USA: ACM, 2014, pp. 701–710.
[32] A. Grover and J. Leskovec, “node2vec: Scalable feature learning for
networks,” in Proc. 22nd ACM SIGKDD Int. Conf. on Knowl. Disc. and
Data Min. San Francisco, California, USA: ACM, 2016, pp. 855–864.
[33] S. Cao, W. Lu, and Q. Xu, “Deep neural networks for learning graph
representations,” in Proc. 32nd AAAI Conf. on Artif. Intell., Phoenix,
Arizona, USA, 2016, pp. 1145–1152.
[34] D. Wang, P. Cui, and W. Zhu, “Structural deep network embedding,” in
Proc. 22nd ACM SIGKDD Int. Conf. on Knowl. Disc. and Data Min.
San Francisco, California, USA: ACM, 2016, pp. 1225–1234.
[35] J. Tang, M. Qu, M. Wang, M. Zhang, J. Yan, and Q. Mei, “Line: Large-
scale information network embedding,” in Proc. 24th Int. Conf. on World
Wide Web. Florence, Italy: International World Wide Web Conferences
Steering Committee, 2015, pp. 1067–1077.
[36] T. Chen, Y. Zhu, Z. Li, J. Chen, X. Li, X. Luo, X. Lin, and X. Zhang,
“Understanding ethereum via graph analysis,” in Proc. IEEE Conf.
Comp. Comm., Honolulu, HI, USA.
[37] G. Wood, “Ethereum: A secure decentralised generalised transaction
ledger,” Ethereum Project Yellow Paper, vol. 151, pp. 1–32, 2014.
[38] L. M. Manevitz and M. Yousef, “One-class svms for document classi-
fication,” J. Mach. Learn. Res., vol. 2, no. Dec, pp. 139–154, 2001.
[39] T. Mikolov, K. Chen, G. Corrado, and J. Dean, “Efficient estimation of
word representations in vector space,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1301.3781,
2013.
[40] T. Mikolov, I. Sutskever, K. Chen, G. S. Corrado, and J. Dean,
“Distributed representations of words and phrases and their composi-
tionality,” in Adv Neur In., Lake Tahoe, Nevada, USA, 2013, pp. 3111–
3119.
